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Introduction
Foreign aid is back on the front burner
of U.S. foreign policy. After World War II
U.S. government dollars helped rebuild
Europe and Asia and contain Soviet
influence. Next, after the collapse of
communism, aid helped newly demo-
cratic states recover from the miseries of
central planning. In his first term,
President Bush increased the U.S.
Government aid budget by 50 percent,
the largest increase since the Marshall
Plan in 1948. Moreover, the way aid is
distributed has been reinvented by the
Bush administration to promote effective
giving through the new Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC).1 U.S. aid,
at $16.3 billion per year in 2003, now
dwarfs other developed countries, with
Japan coming in a distant second at
$8.8 billion. 
Despite this U.S. Government gen-
erosity and creative thinking about for-
eign aid, claims that America is “stingy”
still abound. Economist Jeffrey Sachs,
joined by a chorus that includes the
New York Times editorial page,
European governments and the UN, all
believe that U.S. Government aid is
inadequate. By doubling foreign aid to
Africa in particular, as Sachs and the
report on Africa commissioned by
British Prime Minister Tony Blair recom-
mend, donor countries, it is claimed, will
finally be able to lift Africa out of its
downward economic spiral.
The criticism of American generosity
comes from the much-quoted statistic
that U.S. Government foreign aid ranks
last among developed countries as a per-
centage of gross national income (GNI).
This annoys Americans as we tend to
think of ourselves as a generous people.
We invest the most overseas, provide the
most militarily for global disasters and
security, produce the bulk of the world’s
research and development for better
food and medicines, and provide prefer-
ential trade agreements that support
imports from developing countries.
So, why should America, the richest
nation in the world, not be more caring
with its government foreign aid? The
simple answer is: We are. The standard
measure of foreign aid used to compare
us to other donors, produced by the
Paris-based Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation (OECD),
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is incomplete and misleading. It excludes America’s
private international assistance.
Conservative estimates indicate private interna-
tional assistance, which is growing significantly
every year, is over three and one-half times greater
than U.S. government aid. Americans help people
abroad the same way they help people at home —
through private foundations, corporate giving, vol-
untary organizations, universities, religious organi-
zations, and money sent back home to needy rela-
tives. In 2003 this private philanthropy came to at
least $62.1 billion compared to $16.3 billion of U.S.
Government aid, or what is called Official
Development Assistance (ODA).
This White Paper updates the private interna-
tional giving numbers that were produced by the
Hudson Institute for the U.S. Agency for
International Development report, Foreign Aid in the
National Interest, for 2000.2 The new numbers for
2003, the last year for which data are available, are
significantly higher than 2000 and reflect a contin-
ued growth in private giving as well as increased
interest and attention to better measurement of
U.S. global philanthropy. For its part, the Hudson
Institute is developing a new Index of Global
Philanthropy that will document U.S. private giving
and begin collecting these numbers from European
and other donor countries.
U.S. Government and Private
International Assistance to Developing
Countries
Based on new research and new data sources, the
Hudson Institute has developed a considerably
higher figure for 2003 U.S. private international
assistance than the year 2000. The following table,
using the latest official government figures as well,
shows total U.S. economic engagement with devel-
oping countries. This engagement includes our gov-
ernment foreign aid or ODA, our private assistance
or philanthropy, and our private capital flows or
private investment overseas. The table illustrates
the small role that ODA plays in America’s econom-
ic engagement with the developing world. Over 85
percent of that engagement is through the private
sector, in either philanthropy or private investment. 
Presenting this full picture, not just a limited
government foreign aid number, is a more accurate
way of measuring American generosity and impact
in the world than the current system developed
under the OECD.
Estimated U.S. Total Economic Engagement with Developing
Countries in 2003
$US Billions % of Total
U.S. Official Development Assistance 16.3 13
U.S. Other Country Assistance 1.5 1
U.S. Private Assistance 62.1 47
Foundations 3.3
Corporations 2.7
Non Profits and Volunteerism 6.2
Universities & Colleges 2.3
Religious Organizations 7.5
Individual Remittances 40.1
U.S. Private Capital Flows 51.0 39
U.S. Total Economic Engagement 130.9 100
U.S. Official Development Assistance
This number of $16.3 billion represents what the
OECD allows the U.S. Government to count as
Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is the
so called “donor performance” number that is com-
pared to other countries. It includes the budget of
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the
Peace Corps, contributions to the World Bank and
other multilateral agencies, some State Department
refugee and humanitarian programs and some
Department of Defense humanitarian functions. Not
allowed, and thus not counted in this number, are
significant DOD peacekeeping and security efforts.
Other Country Assistance
This category of $1.5 billion includes U.S. Govern-
ment aid to Israel, the former Soviet Union, and cen-
tral and eastern European nations. Aid to these
countries is not counted in America’s tally because,
according to OECD guidelines, these countries and
regions are more economically developed than others. 
Foundations
Private foundations gave $3.3 billion in 2003. This
figure is based on the Foundation Center
International Grantmaking Report.3 We took corpo-
rate foundation giving of $115 million out of this
number and added it to the corporate giving cate-
gory. We also included some additional foundations
since they were not surveyed in the Foundation
Center report. These give significant amounts to
developing countries, and they include the UN
Foundation, the US Fund for UNICEF, and the
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Better World Foundation, totaling $413 million in
2003. 
Corporations
We found references for corporate giving for a total
of at least $2.7 billion. The corporate giving number
is vastly underestimated since there is no compre-
hensive survey of global corporate philanthropy.
Many companies do not even keep complete records
of their cash and in-kind giving, nor are cause-relat-
ed and overseas affiliate giving well-documented. 
This number is comprised of a separate large-
scale study of the pharmaceutical industry which
included data for in-kind contributions from a sur-
vey conducted by the Center for Pharmaceutical
Health Services Research at the Temple University
School of Pharmacy, sponsored by the Partnership
for Quality Medical Donations (PQMD). This num-
ber is only a sample of nine pharmaceutical compa-
nies out of 33 members of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association. Also included are data
for cash contributions from various company annu-
al reports and the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Associations which has surveyed
the major companies.4
We added additional corporate numbers from
other industries, obtained by researching annual
reports and making direct phone or e-mail commu-
nications with individuals responsible for corporate
philanthropy. USAID also provided a number for
corporate contributions to its Global Development
Alliance (GDA) program. As Hudson proceeds with
developing the new Index of Global Philanthropy,
we hope to capture corporate giving more fully.
Non-Profits and Volunteerism
The total number of $6.2 billion for non-profits and
volunteerism comes from two sources. The first,
$2.9 billion, is from a methodology developed by the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).5
Because USAID keeps full records on its registered
non-profits, the data are considered robust, even if
some U.S. non-profits may not be registered with
them. To this number we added an estimate of vol-
unteer time, reported by the Independent Sector.6
Since the data for the value of 2003 volunteer time
have not been updated, we used the original num-
ber calculated for 2000 of $3.3 billion. 
Universities and Colleges
The $2.3 billion number for universities and col-
leges is reported by USAID from data calculated by
the Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic
Analysis.7 It reflects the dollar amount of scholar-
ships and other support provided by U.S. academic
institutions to students from developing countries.
Religious Organizations
Religious organizations are the most under-report-
ed in international private giving. This is because
most do not keep comprehensive records on global
giving, and there is no systematic survey of all U.S.
religious organizations. The number of $7.5 billion
used here is one reported by various organizations
that have kept records on their international giving.
It does not capture, however, the individual dona-
tions and projects of thousands of local churches,
synagogues and mosques throughout America that
give on a continual basis to overseas people and
projects. 
Worker Remittances
Hudson used USAID-generated data on worker
remittances to developing countries in its compila-
tion of private giving for 2000. The number used in
this Hudson White Paper update, however, includes
a combination of USAID data and new data from
the Multilateral Investment Fund and the Pew
Hispanic Trust. 8,9 These remittance numbers cover
the amounts that all U.S. states are sending back
to Latin America. The number of $30.1 billion is
larger than that of the USAID sample survey for
Latin America. Since similar independent data
sources are not available for other regions of the
developing world, we used the regional numbers
developed by USAID for the rest of developing coun-
tries. These totaled $10 billion, for a total of $40.1
billion that is being sent to relatives and villages in
poor countries for such things as food, medicines,
and shelter.
U.S. Private Capital Flows
This number includes foreign direct investment and
net capital markets in developing and emerging
economies, and is an important measure of U.S.
total economic engagement with developing
nations.10 This category is most indicative of the
U.S. contribution to long-lasting economic growth
and prosperity in these countries. The number
includes direct investment by American companies
in agriculture, manufacturing and service indus-
tries that creates jobs and income for poor people.
It represents the involvement of U.S. companies
and institutions in foreign capital markets as well,
investment that helps develop permanent economic
and social infrastructure in the developing world.
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The Privatization of Foreign Aid
Measuring national generosity only by government
spending ignores new economic realities. Until the
early 1990s most international resources flowing
into developing countries came from governments
through bilateral or multilateral aid programs. But,
in 1992, foreign direct investment and financial
markets took off in developing countries. For the
first time, these private flows exceeded official
financial flows. Developing countries were attract-
ing the kind of private capital that creates and sus-
tains economic growth. 
As financial flows went private, so did foreign
assistance. International private giving has sky-
rocketed over the last twenty-five years. While
Europeans and the Japanese continue to give pri-
marily through their governments, Americans give
primarily through private institutions. Nevertheless,
private giving is growing in Europe as well,
although it is not well-documented. 
Inaccurate Assumptions about Official
Development Assistance (ODA)
Effectiveness of ODA in Reducing Poverty
Those enthusiasts for doubling government aid to
Africa cling to the notion that official development
aid helps countries grow economically and thereby
reduce poverty. They ignore the vast body of evi-
dence over the last two decades showing that there
are few if any economic growth effects from foreign
aid. Citing a few new studies, proponents of mas-
sive foreign aid transfers ignore the majority of
long-standing studies on aid effectiveness. 
It is important to briefly review the actual data
on aid effectiveness because the current arguments
for doubling foreign aid focus only on inputs, not
outputs. Africa has received an estimated total of
$520 billion in ODA over the last 26 years. Even
this figure excludes all the private investment and
philanthropy going into Africa and the continents’
own oil revenue. Since 1978, Nigeria alone has
earned $300 billion from oil exports.11 This, along
with other extractive industries in other African
countries, would double the ODA figure to over 1
trillion dollars. 
Where did this money go? Why is Africa in such
abject poverty? What worked and what didn’t work
in foreign investment and assistance? These are the
questions that need to be answered before the
developed world pours more money into Africa.
Only one study, by World Bank economists in
2000, has shown a possibility of development aid
effectiveness. The authors concluded that,
“Development assistance can contribute to poverty
reduction in countries pursuing sound policies.”12
William Easterly, former senior economist with
the World Bank and professor of economics at New
York University, however, is now questioning even
these findings.13 When the data sets are expanded
beyond the four years used by Dollar, Burnside and
Collier, he found that over the period 1970-1997,
aid as a proportion of GDP growth declined relative
to growth per capita. He concludes that the govern-
ments of poor countries often have little incentive
to raise the productive potential of the poor, espe-
cially when doing so might engender political
activism that threatens the current political elite. 
Aid agencies themselves in this difficult environ-
ment do not have much incentive to achieve
results, since the results are mostly unobservable.
Easterly writes: “One can hardly monitor growth
itself for a given country for a given year, since
growth in any given year or even over a few years
reflects too many other factors besides aid. In these
circumstances, it is understandable the aid agen-
cies prefer to emphasize an observable indicator of
effort — namely aid disbursements.”14
Using the exact specifications as Dollar,
Burnside and Collier, and adding more data than
had become available since their study was per-
formed, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003)
found that the coefficient on the crucial interaction
term between aid and policy was insignificant in
the expanded sample including new data, indicat-
ing no support for the conclusion that “aid works in
a good policy environment.”15
Other studies (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; and
Lensink and White, 2001) have found that when
particular variables are added, the coefficient on
“the interaction between aid and policy becomes
near-zero and/or statistically insignificant.”16
The Easterly findings themselves are consistent
with perhaps the most exhaustive longitudinal
study ever conducted on foreign aid. In January
2000, the Oxford Policy Institute published a retro-
spective study of aid, covering 50 years.17 Some of
its findings include:
• The effects of aid on poverty are complex and,
on average, neutral;
• Aid has had no effect on public spending alloca-
tions: governments simply transfer tax money
away from sectors favored by donors;
• The benefits of public income transfers are
prone to capture by better-off groups;
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• 50 years of aid have done little for the world’s
poorest people or for improving income distribu-
tion;
• Even if governments wish to ensure that the
poor benefit most, officials are constrained by
political considerations to act more on behalf of
better organized more vocal, urban groups;
• Aid managers tend to be judged on their imple-
mentation rates rather than on programme out-
comes;
• Much of the investment [foreign aid] failed to
take into account the recurrent costs of mainte-
nance and service delivery, leaving a legacy in
many poorer countries of unaffordable social
services and of decaying and under-utilized eco-
nomic infrastructure.
The above macro-analyses on lack of aid effec-
tiveness refer primarily to what is called develop-
ment aid, or assistance that is supposed to improve
economic growth and create lasting institutions in
poor countries. 
Other types of foreign aid have had a greater
degree of success. Disaster relief and humanitarian
aid have been more effective and have drawn the
strongest support from the American public. The
United States has been a leader in delivering goods,
coordinating disaster relief, and leveraging vast
resources from private contributors. USAID has
helped countries implement immunization cam-
paigns, feeding programs and public health emer-
gency programs that have saved countless lives
around the world. 
Foreign aid has also been used for security
assistance in countries where the United States has
had strategic interests in combating communism,
promoting peacekeeping, maintaining military
bases, and controlling nuclear weapons and nar-
cotics. This aid has had a mixed record in achiev-
ing strategic objectives. It is not correct to say,
however, as Sachs does in Foreign Affairs, that U.S.
Government security assistance is not “develop-
ment aid.”18 In fact, most of the assistance to
strategically important countries has been delivered
in the form of economic development or humanitar-
ian aid. Unfortunately, though, this aid has had the
same poor track record as development assistance
in other countries.
There are many reasons for lack of aid effective-
ness — it isn’t delivered properly, corrupt govern-
ments siphon it off, donors don’t address the real
problems, it goes into the pockets of aid consult-
ants and so forth. All of these contribute to aid fail-
ures. But, instead of addressing aid effectiveness
and looking at projects, country policies, gover-
nance and economic freedom in African countries,
the enthusiasts for doubling foreign aid focus only
on inputs, not the poor track record on outputs.
In fact, more inputs in the form of ODA has had
an inverse relationship to economic growth in
Africa. In his review of aid effectiveness, “Can
Foreign Aid Buy Growth?,” William Easterly pro-
vides a full review of the theories, data, assump-
tions and fallacies of foreign aid.19 Most notably, he
tracks ODA as a percent of GDP in African coun-
tries against their economic growth over 30 years.
The results are plain to see. Since the late 1970s,
as economic performance in African countries dete-
riorated, ODA increased. 
Ability of Governments to Use More Foreign Aid
Jeffrey Sachs claims that: “The idea that African
failure is due to African poor governance is one of
the great myths of our time.”20 He then points to
past corrupt leaders like Idi Amin and Mobutu, who
are no longer around. With their passing, he seems
to believe that corruption and poor governance in
Africa is no longer around. What is missing from
this analysis, however, is a hard look at many cur-
rent African leaders. Robert Mugabe has caused
famine in his country and is now bulldozing shanty
towns leaving his citizens in despair. The British
High Commissioner and American Ambassador have
openly accused Kenyan officials of stealing from aid
projects intended to help the poor. Poor governance
by non-democratic regimes has been widely docu-
mented by public watch groups and aid agencies
alike, including the World Bank.
Even if Africa were free of corruption and most
of the countries allowed a free press and their citi-
zens to vote, the issue of the continent’s absorptive
capacity to spend aid dollars is a real and growing
problem. A spokesman for Botswana president
Festus Mogae warned, “If people think they can
throw $100 million at a problem and expect every-
thing to work perfectly and quickly, well, it won’t
happen with AIDS….There are all kinds of organi-
zational bottlenecks, training people and retraining
them… It takes time. People can learn from our
mistakes and our successes.”21 Disbursements by
The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and
Tuberculosis (GFAMT) fell from $400 million in
2002 to less than $100 million by the end of 2004. 
The Role of Remittances
Many proponents of increasing government foreign
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aid are highly critical of counting worker remit-
tances to poor countries as private international
philanthropy — despite the fact that these remit-
tances are playing significant roles in developing
countries’ economies. In six Latin American coun-
tries, remittances constitute 10 percent of GDP.
The study by the Multilateral Investment Fund and
Pew Hispanic Trust found that remittances…. “are
keeping large numbers of working-class families
from slipping into poverty.”22
Remittances are being increasingly studied for
their impact on people and economies and are fast
becoming an integral part of global private philan-
thropy. For example, the World Bank states:
“Workers’ remittances provide valuable financial
resources to developing countries, particularly the
poorest.”23 The Blair Commission report was also
high on these newly recognized financial flows to
poor countries: “Remittances are a key source of
financing for developing countries,” the report stat-
ed, “and globally have risen from US $20 billion to
nearly US $100 billion between 1983 and 2003,
long overtaking official capital flows. They are now
the second largest source of development finance,
after FDI.”24 This $100 billion figure refers to remit-
tances from all countries to the developing world.
The Real Problem
Proponents of doubling foreign aid continue to
squabble over the right side of the decimal point as
they try to push the U.S. from .15 to .7 percent of
GNI devoted to ODA. The .7 percent target is a
totally arbitrary milestone with no economic signifi-
cance. Yet First World pundits and Third World
bureaucrats have managed to give it meaning. The
idea originated in the 1950s when the World
Council of Churches urged countries to devote one
percent of GDP to foreign aid.25 Over the years this
morphed into .7 percent, a goal only a handful of
donors have ever reached. Even the OECD, in one
of its reports, admitted that the goal was unreason-
able and countries were likely not able to absorb
that much aid anyway.26
The real problem with the UN Millennium
Development Goals approach and the Blair
Commission report is that they propose statist
models for development, with the bulk of funding
going into public budgets so that government
bureaucrats can engineer solutions for people.
These approaches hold that the problems of global
poverty are solved through massive foreign aid
transfers, grand pronouncements, dramatic events,
and top-down silver bullet solutions. 
There is little recognition that aid projects have
to be conducted in real countries with customs offi-
cials who want bribes, leaders who favor their own
tribes or withhold food from rival tribes or religious
groups, doctors who aren’t paid enough by the gov-
ernment so they sell what should be free medicines
and services, and lack of free press and elections
that provide the important checks and balances on
both private and government officials. 
Celebrities are in the aid game more than ever
now, with Sharon Stone raising $1 million at Davos
for bed nets and Bob Geldof imploring people to join
his Live 8 concerts and G8 protests in Gleneagles,
Scotland. Impractical solutions for reducing poverty,
regardless of how well-meaning, are all around.
Representative Spencer Bachus has stated in the
past that, “to be able to save lives in another coun-
try by forgoing a Big Mac sandwich or a Sunday
newspaper… is a clear example of something we
ought to do out of the goodness of our hearts.” 
Global poverty and government giving has
become an emotional, popularized and trendy
issue, lending only increased support for outdated
and simplistic approaches. 
What Creates Prosperity
Private investment and capital flows create prosperi-
ty. Societies that allow their citizens the freedom to
use their talents without government interference
create prosperity. In this way, wealth spreads quick-
ly among many, not just among a reigning few. 
Government foreign aid can provide crucial help
in disasters and humanitarian assistance and help
leverage projects through public/private partner-
ships, but its role is limited in increasing growth.
Now that Official Development Assistance makes
up a much smaller part of the developing world
economy and private flows of both philanthropy
and investment prevail, the way we measure and
think about foreign aid must change.
In short, ODA is the handout of the last century.
It is America’s total economic engagement with the
developing world that creates prosperity.
The Role of Foreign Assistance — Both
Private and Public
Donors must embrace the full spectrum of interna-
tional assistance, including the much larger private
philanthropy from foundations and churches to
corporations, universities and worker remittances
sent back home. Private aid passes the crucial
“market test” by raising private dollars and volun-
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teer time. Government aid programs should work
more closely with the private sector, partnering
with successful private aid programs.
U.S. Government foreign aid should also foster
philanthropy in recipient nations. Official aid pro-
grams have moved away from this model by working
with large consulting firms, many of which rely on
U.S. Government contracts and are not interested
in working themselves out of a job. Herein, however,
lies a unique niche for foreign aid — helping coun-
tries set up the tax structures, non-profit gover-
nance models, and other systems for private giving.
Foundations, churches, universities, hospitals,
corporations, business associations, volunteer
groups, and hard-working immigrants are delivering
more than just money to developing countries. They
are delivering the values of freedom, democracy,
entrepreneurship, and volunteerism. In this diverse
yet connected world, the U.S. government must
shed its “donor” mentality and become a true part-
ner, enabling others to reduce human suffering and
create lasting institutions to carry on that work.
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